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Abstract Over the past decade, consumers’ electricity costs have risen disproportionally com-
paredwith the average inflation rate, mostly as the result of increased network tariffs and taxes. This
development appears to be at odds with the stated purpose of introducing competition into the
electricity sector through implementation of the EU Electricity Directive to realize benefits for end
users in terms of lower prices as well as better quality of goods and services. This article discusses
the conditions under which the price of electricity can be considered reasonable according to the
Directive. The meaning of the term Breasonable^ may depend on a number of factors, and it is
necessary to distinguish between the various components of an energy bill. The various objectives
of the directive could lead to diverging interpretations, evenwhen applied to the same component of
the bill, the supply price. According to the underlying market principle, reasonable may imply
Beconomically efficient.^ However, in line with the principle of universal service for households,
reasonable should be understood to mean Baffordable.^ The article also examines the conditions
under which a substantial rise of consumer energy costs due to increasing network tariffs can be
justified. The focus of this article is on electricity, although, as stipulated under the Third Gas
Directive, a consumer’s right to pay a reasonable price, while enjoying universal service, applies
equally to gas. Therefore, the observations outlined in this paper are relevant also for gas consumers.
Keywords Reasonable energy price . Regulation
The Disproportionate Increase of Consumer Energy Costs
The purpose of liberalizing the EU’s electricity and gas sector was Bto ensure that EU
consumers receive the full benefits of market opening in terms of lower domestic bills for
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electricity and gas^ through the introduction of competition and the Bfreeing of all electricity
and gas consumers to choose their supplier^ (European Commission 2001a, p. 33). The
liberalization programme was carried out in phases. The first phase, which became effective
on 1 July 2004, comprised the gradual opening of the market to facilitate the supply of energy
to large-scale, industrial end-users1 and from 1 July 2004, at the latest, to all non-household
customers. Subsequently, the energy sector was opened up for all end users, including
households by the Second Electricity Directive and Second Gas Directive on 1 July 2007.2
Competition is still regarded as a key objective of the Third Electricity Directive and the Third
Gas Directive. 3
Furthermore, as stipulated in both Directives, consumers are entitled to a reasonable energy
price based on the right of universal service. Article 3 (3) of the Third Electricity Directive
states that BMember States shall ensure that all household customers, and, where Member
States deem it appropriate, small enterprises (namely enterprises with fewer than 50 occupied
persons and an annual turnover or balance sheet not exceeding EUR 10 million), enjoy
universal service, that is the right to be supplied with electricity of a specified quality within
their territory at reasonable, easily and clearly comparable, transparent and non-discriminatory
prices.^ Gas suppliers have a mandatory duty to inform all consumers with access to the gas
grid of their right to be supplied with natural gas of a certain quality at a reasonable price, in
conformity with national regulatory standards for gas supply (Annex I (1) (g) of the Third Gas
Directive). From this, we can conclude that gas consumers’ right of supply is to be seen in the
light of a universal service in a way similar to that regarding electricity.
However, during the period between 2008 and 2012, nearly every Member State saw
household electricity prices increase. On average, EU household electricity prices increased by
more than 4 % per year. Industrial electricity prices had gone up in that period by about 3.5 %
per year (European Commission 2014a, p. 9).4 Across the EU, gas prices for households
appear to have increased by as much as 60 % over a period of 10 years. This price increase has
in general been higher than the current rise of retail price levels in most individual Member
States (European Commission 2014a, p. 14). The final amounts on electricity bills show an
increase nearly three times as high as the price rises of other goods and services.5 At first
glance, this sharp increase of end-user energy prices seems particularly puzzling because it is
out of line with the aim of liberalizing the energy sector and of creating a universal service.
This article discusses whether this conclusion is correct, using the Third Electricity Directive
as its basis, and examines what constitutes a reasonable energy price. In addition, if an energy
1 Art. 19 of the Directive 96/92/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 19 December 1996
concerning common rules of the internal market in electricity, OJ L 27/20 and Art. 18 of the Directive 98/30/EC
of the European Parliament and the Council of 22 June 1998 concerning common rules for the internal market in
natural gas, OJ L 204/1.
2 Art. 2 (12) and 21 of the Directive 2003/54/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2003
concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 96/92/EC, OJ L 176/37
and Art. 2 (28) and 23 of the Directive 2003/55/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 26 June 2003
concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and repealing Directive 98/30/EC, OJ L 176/57.
3 Directive 2009/72/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common
rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive 2003/54/EC, OJ L 211/55 and Directive 2009/
73/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal
market in natural gas and repealing Directive 2003/55/EC, OJ L 211/94.
4 See for gas: European Commission 2014a, pp. 72–73: More than 3 % per annum on average for household
consumers and about 1 % for industrial end users during the 2008–2012 period.
5 Price developments on the EU retail markets for electricity and gas 1998–2011. Retrieved from: http://ec.
europa.eu/energy/observatory/electricity/doc/analysis_retail.pdf.
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price is considered unreasonable, we need to establish which measures are available in order to
establish a reasonable price.
As the Third Electricity Directive does not define the term Breasonable,^ it will be
necessary to interpret the term according to the text, requirements and objectives of the
Directive. These include the stated purpose of a properly functioning competitive market or,
in other words, of competition. Other objectives include maintaining a universal service and
security of supply and establishing a sustainable energy sector. Security of supply concerns the
continuous delivery of energy through networks. The delivery of energy depends on the
continuous operation of a complex grid structure to deliver energy from production units to
end-users. Furthermore, the environmental objective of the Third Package is relevant. Ways to
protect our environment include energy savings, re-use, and production and consumption of
renewable energy.
These objectives form part of the European legal framework. This can be deduced
from, among other things, the fact that the Third Electricity Directive expressly
requires the NRAs to include as part of their task any reasonable measures necessary
to achieve the objectives stated in the Directive (Article 36 of the Third Electricity
Directive).6 Therefore, NRAs are tasked, among other duties, to pursue both compe-
tition and consumer protection measures.
For purposes of this analysis, it should be noted that end-user electricity bills (like
gas bills) are made up of several components. We shall therefore have to consider for
each component individually whether the Third Electricity Directive’s requirement of
reasonableness applies and what it entails for the component in question. Therefore,
the article defines the various components of electricity bills. Secondly, the article
discusses whether these components are subject to competition. In so far, as this is the
case, the meaning of Ba reasonable price for energy^ is interpreted in line not only
with the stated purpose of a competitive market, but also with a requirement of a
universal service. The article also discusses what may be regarded as reasonable with
regard to the components of the energy bill that fall outside the scope of competition,
insofar as the requirement applies also to those components. This concerns network
tariffs in particular. Finally, this article discusses the public measures a Member State
could take to mitigate any unreasonable adverse effects of increases of energy cost for
consumers. A conclusion is then presented.
Energy Bill Components
The energy value chain consists of various components, including production, trading, supply,
distribution and transport via a network. However, the liberalization of the energy sector
applies only to the production, trading and supply segments. According to neoclassical
economic theory, the supply price should be the result of competition and consequently, of
the interaction of supply and demand. The supply price includes the price paid by the supplier
for purchasing energy on the wholesale market and includes capital expenditures (CAPEX)
and operating expenses (OPEX) of production units.
In addition to a supply price, the end user energy bill includes a regulated tariff for access to
the network, for transport and distribution, and for network services. Market forces are not a
6 See also Art. 40 of the Third Gas Directive.
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decisive factor in establishing and setting network tariffs since the energy transmission and
distribution network services have remained outside the scope of liberalization (Künneke
1999).7 After all, electricity transmission and distribution systems are operated by legal
monopolies (Cabau 2007; Energy Community Secretariat 2012, para. 3.2.1). The underlying
premise is that a monopoly is necessary to guarantee the large, long-term investments required
for network infrastructures, as these could not be properly ensured under competitive condi-
tions. Operating several electricity networks within the same area is considered inefficient. The
monopoly of transport and distribution system operators is subject to far-reaching regulation to
prevent abuse.
The energy bill also comprises taxes, including energy tax and value added tax (VAT).
According to the Energy Taxation Directive,8 Member States have a legal obligation to levy
taxes on energy supply services. The implementation of energy tax regulations was intended to
promote energy efficiency, among others, through the reduction of energy use. Requirements
laid down in the Tax Directive consider energy sources as well as energy use regimes. The
Directive provides Member States with ample latitude for national policies regarding the
application of taxation, allowing a broad spectrum of general interest issues to be considered
and prioritised. Member States are granted discretion for expanding the scope of the exemp-
tions stipulated in the Tax Directive and, additionally, can exempt companies that supply
renewable energy. This leaves room for considerations regarding environmental objectives to
play a relevant role. National law establishes the levels of taxes and exemptions, and these are
the result of a democratic process of public decision-making by legislative authorities of
Member States taking into account various public interests such as energy efficiency and
support for energy-intensive industries that are subject to strong international competition. This
taxation law is intended to serve as a complementary measure to the European Emissions
Trade System (EU ETS), according to which large producers of fossil energy are required to
obtain emission allowances for production. The taxation of energy products and the cost of
emission allowances may lead to a further increase of consumer energy prices since energy
companies can be assumed to pass these on to end users.
The following two sections focus on the requirement of Breasonableness^ of energy prices
with regard to both supply price and network tariffs.
Reasonable Supply Price
From analyses presented previously, it follows that the way to define a reasonable price is
primarily by reference to the stated objective of a competitive market only insofar as the supply
price is concerned. Therefore, with regard to the supply price, we may interpret the meaning of
reasonable in the light of the competition principle. Subsequently, the meaning of a reasonable
price according to the principle of universal service as laid down by the Third Electricity
Directive will be examined. This is in order to determine whether what is considered
reasonable by reference of universal service is consistent with what is reasonable in terms of
competitive market outcomes.
7 The municipality of Feldheim provides a rare example of competing energy networks. Retrieved from: http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/12/29/feldheim-germany-renewable_n_1173992.html.
8 Council Directive 2003/96/EC of 27 October 2003 restructuring the Community framework for the taxation of
energy products and electricity, OJ L 283/51.
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Competition
The market mechanism is said to establish price levels through the interaction between the
forces of supply and demand (Brennan andMoehler 2010; Krugman et al. 2011). According to
neoclassical economic theory, in a competitive market, the price mechanism will lead to
optimised allocation and use of goods and services and, ultimately, maximum prosperity for
energy consumers and lower prices helped by efficiency gains. Efficiency gains can include
cost reductions through a more efficient operation of existing assets and through the use of
cheaper or new and more efficient energy production technologies (Pollitt 2008, p. 4). The
proper functioning of a market is measured by the intensity of competition in the marketplace
(Belyaev 2011, p. 31). The intensity of competition depends, among other things, on the
number of market players, including both suppliers and customers. There must be a sufficient
number of suppliers, none of which represents a market majority (Belyaev 2011, p. 43). In
addition, the market share of each player must be such that none of them can unilaterally set
the rules and determine market outcomes. If a seller or buyer withdraws from the marketplace
in a liquid market, this should not materially affect prices. This is a matter of market liquidity,
which must be adequate.
By systematically keeping profit margins low whilst ensuring the best possible
quality of the product or service at marginal production and delivery costs, a properly
functioning market system allows prices to move towards an equilibrium. In other
words, this approach supposes a correlation between competition and efficiency. In
line with the economic approach to market mechanism, price movements induced by a
competitive market may be considered to be reasonable under the Directive. The term
reasonable in this sense refers to economically efficient. From the economic perspec-
tive, a robust competitive market, as envisaged by the Third Electricity Directive,
could ensure that the best available mix of assets and suppliers is used to deliver
electricity to meet the need of consumers in the most cost-efficient manner.
For all economic sectors, including the energy industry, the stated purpose of a competitive
market has been expressed in the right to free movement of goods, services and capital as laid
down in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (Articles 26, 28, 56 and 63 of
the Treaty). The reasoning is that any impediment to the free movement of goods, services and
capital must be removed in order to create an internal market (Lenaerts and Van Nuffel 2011, p.
196). As such, the competitive market theory also determines the content of the European legal
framework in energy. For instance, the competitive market theory forms the basis for condi-
tions intended to protect consumers in Annex I to the Third Electricity Directive. These include
a number of requirements regarding the content of supply contracts and accessible procedures
for settlement of disputes. The contractual conditions for consumers, for example, must be fair
and available in advance, and suppliers may unilaterally increase prices only under certain
conditions.9 These requirements contribute towards consumer empowerment and seek to
create an articulate and well-informed market party capable of making mature choices
regarding suppliers and standing up for its rights, thus encouraging actual competition. For
purposes of consumer protection, consumers are assumed to be prepared and capable of
9 See also CJEU judgement of 21 March 2013, RWE Vertrieb AG/Verbraucherzentrale Nordrhein-Westfalen, C-
92/11, ECR nyr.; CJEU judgement of 23 October 2014, Technische Werke Schussental GmbH und Co KG/
Alexandra Schulz and Josef Egbringhoff/Stadtwerke Ahaus GmbH, joined cases C-359/11 & C-400/11, ECR
nyr.
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enjoying the benefits of a competitive market (Micklitz 2013, pp. 272, 291–273, 345). The
requirements in the Annex intend to provide consumers the requisite means for this.
However, in practice, in many Member States, the operation of the free market is severely
limited as a result of price regulation. Under these regulations, supply prices quoted to
consumers are subject to supervision and approval by a public authority prior to their release.
Even a decade after the first phase of liberalizing the energy sector, in a majority of the
Member States supply, retail prices are regulated and price caps and other regulatory measures
on EU incumbents are common. As of 2012, 18 Member States continue to regulate retail
prices. Cyprus, France, Greece, Hungary and many other Member States apply rate-of-return
regulation. Five other Member States, including Denmark, Estonia and Portugal, have set price
caps (European Commission 2014a, pp. 31–32; European Commission 2012b, p. 15). Evi-
dently, prices for energy have been artificially reduced by these caps (Energy Commission
Secretariat 2012, p. 1).10 The following part will examine to what extent such price measures
by Member States are consistent with the Third Electricity Directive.
Public Service Obligations
The Third Electricity Directive allows competition to be limited in certain cases, such as by the
price measures mentioned earlier. After all, under European law Member States have discre-
tionary powers (Article 3 (2) of the Third Electricity Directive) to impose public service
obligations (PSOs) on energy companies and utilities in the general economic interest
(European Commission 2013). This provision covers a range of varying general interests.
According to the Third Electricity Directive, PSOs may relate to Bsecurity, including security
of supply, regularity, quality and price of supplies and environmental protection, including
energy efficiency, energy from renewable sources and climate protection.^ Although consumer
protection is not explicitly stated in Article 3 (2) of the Directive, the Member States can also
impose PSOs to protect consumers (Delvaux et al. 2012), in particular to ensure the individual
consumer’s right to be charged a reasonable price (European Commission 2001a; Energy
Commission Secretariat 2012; ERGEG 2010). After all, according to the formulation of the
provision in the Directive as confirmed also in the Federutility judgment11 discussed later on,
the list of general interests for PSOs is not exhaustive.
The discretionary powers of Member States to regulate supply prices by price caps or other
price measures are however limited by the criteria defined in the Directive and by the
Federutility judgment. According to the Directive, such obligations Bshall be clearly defined,
transparent, non-discriminatory, verifiable and shall guarantee equality of access for electricity
undertakings of the Community to national consumers.^ Also, Member States may impose
these obligations only on energy companies if the general rules for free movement of goods
and service are observed. According to general principles of EU law, these freedoms may in
some cases be restricted, but only if certain criteria are met, as stated by the Federutility
judgment. In this judgement, the Italian energy authority, the Autorità per l’energia elettrica e il
gas, had introduced reference prices in agreement with the regulatory standards of national
government energy policy. Customers were free to choose between the current market retail
10 See for gas: EC 2014a, p. 92: The scope of price regulation in 15Member States seems to be more limited than
for electricity.
11 CJEU judgement of 20 April 2010, Federutitity, C-265/08, ECR I-3377.
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value and the fixed maximum values set by the state. The majority of end users opted for the
latter because the reference price was artificially kept below the market price.12
Under this jurisprudence, Member States must firstly ensure that the implemented price
regulation is consistent with the provisions on the services of general economic interest and
that the price regulation serves a public interest that falls under the scope of Article 3 (2).
Member States have to weigh the various general interests and objectives and any price
measure should be the result of balancing the different public interests and values, including
the protection of consumers and providing universal service. Member States do retain a certain
margin of discretionary authority to determine and prioritize their relevant public interest
objectives. However, PSOs imposed by a Member State must satisfy the necessity require-
ment, which is derived from the EU law proportionality principle.13 According to this
requirement, price ceilings are permitted only if there is no alternative, less far-reaching
method to realize a reasonable price for end-users and if the fixed price imposition is of a
temporary nature (European Commission 2013). Furthermore, the imposition of the price
measure must be clearly defined and must comply with the criteria of objectivity and
transparency. Moreover, energy companies must be ensured a non-discriminatory access to
the retail market. Price regulation may also vary depending on the purpose and given
circumstances in the Member States involved so that a Member State may be compelled to
differentiate between various groups of end-users. This could imply that a price ceiling
regulation may need to be imposed in favour of only a specific group of end-users, such as
households. In other words, given the Federutility judgment, an implementation of price
regulations that lacks differentiated targeting strategies aimed at the different end-user seg-
ments may be in conflict with the proportionality principle.
According to the Federutility judgment, price regulation can be legal if it serves to protect
consumers against excessive supply prices. Excessively high prices can be caused by a lack of
market liquidity, as was the case in Federutility itself. In practice, many Member States do not
have a liquid market, with by far the largest part of the market being served by only a small
number of enterprises. This is partly due to the limited number of transmission interconnec-
tions between Member States. Regulation of electricity end prices is therefore a common
indicator of insufficient competition in the wholesale market (Pollitt 2008, p. 7).
In line with the stated purpose of a properly operating competitive market, price regulation
is permitted only in the event that competition has not yet reached a sufficient level (and then
only for the duration of such a situation of limited competition). It is therefore also essential for
Member States to introduce measures to promote competition. The aim is to ultimately render
price regulation by Member States superfluous. To promote this objective, the Third Electricity
Directive introduced stricter requirements over and above the Second Electricity Directive
with regard to the unbundling of energy companies, the expansion of transport system
interconnections and the improvement of market transparency (European Commission
2012a; Lecoque 2011). In line with such developments, the Commission has started various
infringement proceedings (Energy Commission Secretariat 2012).14 According to this reading,
12 The ruling relates to the supply of gas as well as to the Second Gas Directive, but it is of equal significance for
both the electricity sector and the rules under the Third Electricity Directive.
13 See also CJEU judgement of 1 July 2014, Ålands Vindkraf, C-573/12, ECR nyr. and CJEU judgement of 21
December 2011, ENEL, C-242/10, ECR I-13665.
14 Press Release, Energising Europe: A real market with secure supply, 19 September 2007. Retrieved from:
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-07-1361_en.htm?locale=en.
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the Federutility judgment is in agreement with the competitive market theory mentioned
previously.
Universal Service
The next important step is to determine what exactly the requirement of a reasonable supply
price based on universal service entails, and whether this is consistent with the concept of a
reasonable price based on economic criteria as discussed previously. It is therefore necessary
first to explain the scope of universal service under the relevant directives.
The term Buniversal service^ concerns the provision of certain services of a
specified quality at an affordable price and in conformity with nation-specific circum-
stances. Such services should be made available to all consumers and end-users within
the territory of the respective Member State, regardless of its geographical location.
Universal services provide warranties for the fulfilment of basic human needs, such as
supplies of electric power and gas, which are deemed to socially impact the well-
being of citizens. Universal services include all those areas of the society and the
economy without which the consumer cannot participate in the normal economic,
social and political life, such as energy and telecommunications (Micklitz 2013, p.
309). Universal service also implies that consumers living on or falling below the
poverty line must also be able to purchase energy. This consideration shows that
universal service is not aimed solely at the availability of energy, but also at meeting
the requirement of affordability (European Commission 2001a, p. 29). The affordabil-
ity of electric power, amongst others, strengthens community empowerment and
economic and social cohesion across Member States (European Commission 2003,
para. 3.1.4). It is then left to the discretion of individual EU Member States to define
what an affordable retail price is and to prioritize appropriate consumer protection
standards.15 In any case, the term reasonable will need to be interpreted while bearing
in mind that all the people must be able to participate in economic, social and
political life. This depends on various factors, not just the price of supplying elec-
tricity, but also for example on income and the local cost of living. Member States
have a responsibility to consider these various aspects.
The reading of reasonable as affordable agrees with the description given by the
Universal Service Directive16 of a universal service for the market of electronic
communication networks and services, a market similar to the electricity market. In
both cases, the service depends on access to a network and constitutes an essential
service to EU citizens. The Universal Service Directive explicitly states that BMember
States shall ensure that the services set out in Chapter II of this Directive are made
available at the quality specified to all end-users in their territory, independently of
geographical location, and, in the light of specific national conditions, at an affordable
price^ (Article 3 (1) of the Universal Service Directive). This is all the more
important for electricity because it is an essential service for EU citizens without
15 Recital 50 of Third Electricity Directive speaks of Bfair prices^; see also Recital 7 of Third Gas Directive.
16 Directive 2002/22/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on universal service
and users’ right relating to electronic communications networks and services (Universal Service Directive), OJ L
108/51.
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which they would not have other basic services, such as telecommunications, at their
disposal.
Various Types of End Users
From the perspective of universal service, it is essential to distinguish between the various
profiles of end-users (Lavrijssen 2014; Pront-van Bommel 2011a). In any event, all households
are entitled to a reasonable price for electricity as part of a universal service. The electricity
supply to households is regarded as customer purchases of electricity to be used for home
consumption of energy only and therefore not intended to be utilised either in commercial or in
professional activities (Article 2 (10) of the Third Electricity Directive17). In addition, accord-
ing to Article 3 (3), individual Member States have discretionary powers to extend the scope of
this definition to include small and medium-sized enterprises (defined as having up to 50 FTE
employees or an annual turnover of up to €10 million) and organizations in the regulatory
provisions of national energy legislation.
In contrast, large-scale customers do not qualify for reasonable market price conditions
under these provisions of the Third Electricity Directive. However, large-scale users may be
able to force down the price of electricity, for instance by using their countervailing market
power or competition law in the event that competition is distorted by the abuse of a dominant
market position, or by means of antitrust suits and unfair competition claims (Cameron 2007;
Hariharan and Ghaya 2010). In this respect, the regulatory scope of competition law extends
beyond the provisions that follow from the above-mentioned principles of EU energy legis-
lation and includes potential large-scale end users.
Vulnerable Consumer
The Third Electricity Directive in particular has adopted warranties addressing the needs of
vulnerable consumers who constitute a more specifically defined consumer segment (Article 3
(7) of the Third Electricity Directive18). The Third Electricity Directive stipulates that Member
States have to define the term consumer vulnerability, which among other criteria refers to
energy poverty.
In this respect, a fundamental public interest is at stake, as access to energy is a sine qua non
for preparing food, maintaining health, giving and receiving education, undertaking economic
activities, etc. In short, access to energy for humans is crucial for satisfying all basic human
needs and for the realization of fundamental rights including participation in economic activity
and as such in overcoming poverty and social isolation (Bradbrook and Gardam 2010;
Bradbrook 2006; Tully 2006) The reason for protecting vulnerable consumers is that access
to electricity can be considered a human right, given its vital role for realising other funda-
mental rights such as dignity, health and education, even if the right to have access to energy as
such is not explicitly mentioned in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights.
At the very least, the right to have access to energy can be supposed to be an inseparable
component of socio-human rights (Bradbrook 2006). According to the Charter, EU citizens are
in any case entitled to human dignity. A life without access to an appropriate electricity source
to fulfil basic human needs is degrading and could be seen to violate the right to dignity
17 See also Art. 3 (3) of the Third Gas Directive.
18 See also Art 3 (3) of the Third Gas Directive.
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(Articles 1) (Aviles 2012). Furthermore, the right to energy of a specified quality must also be
considered as a service of general economic interest, as provided under the Treaty and EU
legislation based on it, which Member States have to recognize and respect (Article 36 of the
Charter). This means that electricity ought to be within the financial reach of each EU citizen.
The Charter is legally binding for EU institutions and national governments.
The presence of such binding legal provisions does not alter the fact that, today, energy
poverty is a major problem. Almost 11 % of the EU population were unable to keep their
homes adequately warm in 2012. The situation was even worse for low-income households,
which tend to spend proportionally more on electricity, gas and heating-related fuels than
medium-income or high-income households (European Commission 2014a, p. 125). In the
EU, as a whole, 24.4 % of the population living in low-income households are unable to
adequately heat their homes. The situation varies across Member States. In Bulgaria, for
instance, only 46.5 % of the people can properly warm their homes (European Commission
2014a, p. 127). The issue of energy poverty has therefore increasingly featured on the EU
agenda in recent years (Thomson and Snel 2013). It is therefore especially important to find
out which provisions are available to Member States for ensuring reasonable energy costs.
Reasonable According to Universal Service
In conclusion, according to the principle of universal service, Member States are obliged to
implement appropriate measures to maintain a high standard of consumer protection, in
particular by adopting a socially oriented approach towards low-income households and by
reducing consumer vulnerability in general. The right to have access to energy also includes
affordability and reliability of the electricity supply (Bradbrook and Gardam 2010).
Considered from the perspective of universal service, the term reasonable should be
interpreted in line with the principles of Bfairness^ and Bsocial justice^ rather than the principle
of a competitive market according to which a reasonable price is seen as a economically
efficient result of competition. After all, taking into account the previously mentioned factors
contributing towards the realization of a more competitive market, a high supply price could be
economically efficient and may be defined as reasonable insofar as it is the outcome of
sufficient competition and includes a limited operating profit margin. However, from the
perspective of universal service, the term reasonable would not be necessarily synonymous
with Baffordable for households,^ particularly where vulnerable consumers are involved. In a
liquid market, high end-user prices for the supply of energy could well be the result of
increased purchase prices paid by energy-producing companies on the commodity wholesale
market to cover the replenishment of raw materials such as oil or other necessary investments
made in a particular year. An increasing supply price can also be caused by passing on the cost
of the taxation of energy products or of CO2 emission rights, as such passing on would occur
in accordance with competitive market principles. However, passing these costs on to end-
users may substantially affect families living on a restricted household budget and may cause
electricity to become unaffordable (Pront 2012). In such a case, the electricity price would be
at odds with the universal service principle. This reflects a conflict between diverging
objectives of the Directive, giving cause for fundamental criticism against the economic
approach as described. The fundamental criticism concerns the absence of a way to judge fair
distribution in relation to well-being and the failure to address such issues as fairness, equality,
justice, human rights and equity. Economic efficiency does not automatically mean that the
market has resulted in an ethically acceptable allocation of goods and values, and separately
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from these, to well-being (Baujard 2013; Feintuck 2010; Hammond 1992; Sen 1987, pp. 7,
28–32, 78).
The above analysis suggests that there may not be a competitive market within which a
reasonable price is achieved. In such an event, price control actions by the Member States may
be legal according to the Federutility judgement. However, even in a competitive market, the
price may be unreasonable, albeit in terms of fairness and based on ethical considerations. The
underlying thought is that the distribution of goods and means should be considered unfair
from a point of view of human rights. In such an event, given the proportionality principle as
defined by the judgment, Member States should consider the availability of any other methods
that may safeguard an affordable energy price and that are less detrimental to the competitive
market mechanism.
According to the Third Electricity Directive, Member States Bshall take appropriate mea-
sures, such as formulating national energy action plans, providing benefits in social security
systems to ensure the necessary electricity supply to vulnerable customers, or providing for
support for energy efficiency improvements, to address energy poverty where identified,
including in the broader context of poverty^ (Article 3 (8)). Actions that may contribute to
limiting the total price of energy include the introduction of measures promoting flexible
electricity use, the introduction of smart meters and the promotion of local renewable energy
generation near end-user locations that can contribute to the efficient operation of distribution
systems and can help to keep a grip on the rise of network costs. Network tariffs should reflect
any network cost savings resulting from demand-side improvements, demand-response mea-
sures and distributed generation, including savings from reduced cost of delivery or network
investments and optimised network operation under the Energy Efficiency Directive.19 The
large-scale implementation of smart metering and sophisticated internet communication tech-
nology (ICT) is mandatory, subject to a positive result of the compulsory cost/benefit analysis
of Member States (Article 9 of the Energy Efficiency Directive). One function of smart
metering is to provide households with accurate and current information of their energy
consumption in order to stimulate awareness and ultimately bring about efficient energy use
and energy savings.
On the basis of the previous statement, we can conclude that in a liquid market, a general
price measure will usually be at odds with the principle of proportionality. Other measures will
then be needed to establish a reasonable cost of energy. It will be also necessary to define the
group of consumers for whom the price of electricity is prohibitive. They might consist only of
a limited group of consumers. Furthermore, a prohibitive energy price could also be the result
of high network tariffs and taxes, in which case supply price regulation will not bring a
solution.
Reasonable Network Tariffs
From the previous statement, it becomes clear that the retail price forms only part of the total
amount to be paid for electricity (European Commission 2014b; European Commission
2012b, p. 34, Fig. 5). A prohibitive energy price could also be the result of high network
19 Directive 2012/27EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012 on energy effiency,
amending Directives 2009/125/EC and 2010/30/EU and repealing Directives 2004/8/EC and 2006/32/EC, OJ L
315/1.
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tariffs and taxes, in which case supply price regulation will not bring about a solution.
Moreover, network costs and taxes represent a large part of an end-user’s energy bill. On
top of that, their part in the energy bill has increased considerably in recent years. In 2008,
taxes and levies on average accounted for 9 % of household energy costs (European
Commission 2014a, p. 23). Network charges also constitute a substantial part of final energy
prices, in 2012 reaching 50 % in the case of households, and 56 % in the case of industrial
consumers. The taxes and levies component of the EU weighted average price went up by
36.5 % in 2012, whilst it accounts on average for 30 % of the final price, up from 26 % in
2008. During the 2008–2012 period, network costs on average went up by around 18.5 % for
households and 30 % for industrial consumers (European Commission 2014b, p. 7). Hence, it
is worth underscoring that most of a consumer’s energy bill falls outside the scope of market
liberalization and competition principles.
Moreover, network tariffs and taxes are the components that have driven up household
energy bills the most. Whereas the energy component remained the most important element in
the end consumer bill, its relative share registered significant decreases (more than 10 % for
industrial consumers and about half as much for households). As the relative share of network
costs remained relatively stable, representing about a third of the bill, it was the taxation
component that filled the gap left by the supply of energy component. At the same time, their
share also varies per Member State. In the case of electricity prices paid by households, in
2012, the energy component was between 3.2 Eurocent/kWh (Romania) and 20.4 Eurocent/
kWh (Cyprus) and accounted for between 18 % (Denmark) and 82 % (Malta) of the household
electricity price. In 2008, taxes and levies represented on average 26 % of the median
household bill, being as low as 5 % for Malta, the UK and Lithuania, and accounting for
more than half of the bill in Denmark (52 %). In 2012, the relative share of taxes reached 30 %
on average, ranging from 5 % in the UK to close to 30 % in Austria, Estonia, Finland, France,
Italy and Sweden, and reaching 43, 46 and 56 % respectively in Portugal, Germany and
Denmark. Also, the impact of the different components on the final amount of the energy bill
varies according to the type of end user. The actual value of the imposed cost components is
significantly higher for households than for large industrial customers. On the other hand, large
customers may be partially or completely exempt from certain network charges, taxes and
levies (European Commission 2014b; European Commission 2014a, pp. 15–24 and 33;
European Commission 2012a, 2012b).20
Requirements Regarding Network Tariffs
Given the need to protect consumers against excessively high energy bills, it is essential to
consider the requirements imposed by the Third Electricity Directive with regard to the tasks of
network operators and also the level of network tariffs, as they determine what is considered
reasonable in this context. According to the Third Electricity Directive, energy networks must
at least be accessible to anyone on the basis of non-discriminatory, objective and transparent
conditions. These criteria help to safeguard the right of third party access (Article 32 (1) of the
Third Electricity Directive). Network operators are then bound to connect consumers and other
market parties in accordance with these criteria (Article 3 (3) of the Third Electricity Direc-
tive). Furthermore, network operators should also guarantee the continuity of supply.
20 See for gas: European Commission 2014a, pp. 79–85.
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In addition, tariffs or pricing methodologies applied by network operators must be fixed or
approved by NRAs. We have already seen that NRAs are bound to fulfil their legal regulation
task in line with the requirements and objectives laid down in the Third Electricity Directive
(Article 37). These objectives concern not only access to the market, but also the security of
supply and energy-efficiency as well as the integration of large and small-scale production of
electricity from renewable energy sources and the distributed generation in both transmission
and distribution networks (Article 37 (d) of the Third Electricity Directive). What is reasonable
in this context is also determined by the principles of good governance that apply to NRAs.
Although NRAs have discretionary power when approving and setting a network tariff, its
implementation is subject to the restrictions imposed by such principles. These concern,
among other matters, the independence, transparency (Article 35 sub 4 of the Third
Electricity Directive) and accountability of supervision. These principles have partly
been embedded in the European Directives, such as for regarding the requirements of
transparency and motivation of supervision decisions they entail.21 The principle of
proportionality is another principle of good governance, based on which NRAs must
balance the public interests (Karpen 2010; Lenaerts and van Nuffel 2011; Lavrijssen-
Heijmans 2006; European Commission 2001b, pp. 7–8).
Therefore, given the absence of competition, for the establishment of legal tariffs, reason-
able means something other than Beconomically efficient.^ A reasonable increase in network
tariffs could be defined as a proportionate outcome of the weighing of various public values. In
the longer term, as the priorities of the objectives change, the balance of interests might tip the
other way. This implies that various criteria for the reasonableness of network tariffs apply,
ranging from operating efficiency, moderate cost recovery, benchmark-based evaluation and
fair surcharges to investments guaranteeing security of supply. In recent years, objectives
regarding energy efficiency and continuity of supply have gained importance. Therefore, an
increase in network tariffs could be reasonable to safeguard security of supply or to realize an
environmental objective, as explained in the following section.
Investing in Transport and Distribution Systems
Environmental objectives and security of supply both require substantial financial investments
towards innovation in the transmission and distribution infrastructure. Infrastructural invest-
ments are necessary as current assets become outdated. Furthermore, the existing energy
infrastructure needs innovative adaptation. Network operators must invest in the construction
of modern transport and distribution systems to ensure that the new generation of renewable
energy producers has unrestricted and easy access to the transmission and distribution system.
Investing in innovative adaptation not only helps to achieve environmental objectives, but is
also considered important to ensure security of supply. One aspect of supply security associ-
ated with network innovation concerns the legal responsibility of transmission and distribution
system operators to ensure an uninterrupted energy supply. This supply warranty is jeopardised
in the event of a mass rollout of network connections for producers of renewable energy. This
is due to the fact that renewable energy depends on intermittent sources and the fact that we
have no cost-efficient means (as yet) of storing electricity (Bradbury et al. 2014). A critical
condition for energy transport systems to maintain security of supply is to balance demand and
21 Art. 35 sub 4 and Art. 37 sub 16 of the Third Electricity Directive and Art. 39 sub 4 and Art. 41 sub 16 of the
Third Gas Directive.
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supply in order to prevent outages. A higher level of flexibility of energy is therefore required
to facilitate the effective integration of intermittent energy production installations, such as
through a dynamic demand response to real-time electricity supply conditions, features that go
beyond the technical ability of conventional network infrastructures. To develop further
flexibility of demand on a distributed level, a large-scale roll-out of smart grid technology
equipped with smart meters and integrated, innovative internet technology (IT) applications is
essential (Erlinghagen and Markard 2012; Pront-van Bommel 2011b).
The expenditure involved in such adaptations is enormous. It is estimated that in order to
achieve the 20 % EU energy efficiency target for 2020, investments amounting up to 1000
billion euros will be needed towards a full integration of innovative energy infrastructure
across EU Member States, both in transmission and distribution network infrastructure and in
the renewable energy production capacity (European Commission 2010). The tremendous
investments in transmission and distribution systems will have to be paid largely from network
tariffs. These investments will presumably cause regulated network tariff rates to rise further.
Based on the above, we can conclude that according to the Third Electricity Directive,
higher energy costs could be justified as reasonable in terms of security of supply and
environmental objectives. At the same time, these higher energy costs may be in conflict with
consumer interests and affordability. For instance, these interests were recently the topic of
heated debates in Germany on the feed-in system.22 Under the feed-in system, small and large
generators of renewable energy, such as produced by wind generators and solar panels, have a
right to be paid a long-term, guaranteed, cost-based purchase price that includes a reasonable
return for the energy delivered to the network. The purpose of this provision is to enable
investors to help develop technologies. The compensation rates should make it possible for an
installation—when managed efficiently—to be operated cost-effectively based on the use of
state-of-the-art technology and depending on the renewable energy sources naturally available
in a given geographical environment. In many other Member States local producers of
renewable energy have already been entitled to fixed feed-in tariffs (Mendonça et al. 2010).
This legal provision aims to stimulate the production and use of renewable energy in response
to the underlying environmental targets. Feed-in rates in Germany paid by energy system
operators are subsequently passed on to end-users. This feed-in system is under discussion due
to the fact that the impact of this particular cost aspect on consumer energy bills affects
vulnerable consumers much more than other market participants (Hünter 2012). 23
Conclusions
A reasonable energy price is guaranteed under EU legislation, and affordable energy is crucial
for satisfying all basic human needs. For this reason, the article examines whether recent
increases in consumer energy bills may be regarded as reasonable according to the Third
22 Act on granting priority to renewable energy sources (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz—EEC), 1 January 2012.
23 The feed-in system in Germany was recently overhauled, and most new producers must now offer the
renewable energy on the market to subsequently receive a supplementary premium to cover the cost. In 2014
this law was reformulated in stricter terms for new producers. As from 1 August 2014, producers of renewable
energy, with the exception of small-scale producers, in principle no longer receive a feed-in tariff, and instead
must offer their energy for sale on the market. They may also receive a supplementary remuneration linked to the
feed-in tariff.
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Electricity Directive, which guarantees a consumer’s right to a reasonable price as part of
universal service. However, the Directive fails to define what is meant by reasonable.
The article seeks to fill in this gap based on the various objectives encapsulated in the Third
Electricity Directive, starting with the objective of competition. After all, the original aim of
introducing competition through the Directive was to give consumers the benefit of lower
prices as well as higher quality goods and services as a result of supply and demand
interaction. In line with the stated purpose of the competition principle, the term reasonable
refers to a price that is the result of an efficiently operating market.
However, in most Member States, market effects have been drastically restricted by
price regulation, even though Member States may only resort to price regulation
insofar as this is in line with the legal requirements for imposing PSOs. Under the
Third Electricity Directive a Member State has the discretionary power to impose
PSOs, including price regulation, on energy companies, on condition that these are
consistent with the EU legal framework. The PSO must be aimed at safeguarding a
public interest included in the Directive, other than competition. Price regulation may
therefore be permissible to offer protection to consumers. In addition, the PSO must
satisfy the requirements of necessity and subsidiarity, which are derived from the
principle of proportionality. Price regulation may be seen as compatible with the
stated purpose of a more competitive market if it is used to reduce high supply
prices resulting from an insufficiently liquid market. Even so, when considering
regulation from this perspective, Member States will subsequently need to introduce
measures to promote competition as much as possible, among others, by the
unbundling of energy companies, the expansion of transport system interconnections,
and the improvement of market transparency.
It is a remarkable fact that, although most Member States have drastically limited compe-
tition by introducing price regulations, ultimately, this has not protected end-users from a
disproportionate increase in electricity costs. To understand this contradiction, the article
analysed the various components that make up an energy bill, such as supply price, network
tariffs, taxes and levies. Of these, only the supply price is subject to competition in the current
environment.
The major drivers of the disproportionate rise of end-user electricity costs appear to
be increasing taxes, levies and network tariffs. These comprise a large part of an
energy bill. In view of this development, we can explain the combination of the
substantial rise of consumer energy costs and, simultaneously, price regulation. Given
the variety of components making up an energy bill, price regulation can protect end-
users from rapid supply price increases, but not from any rise in the other electricity
bill components. On the other hand, a substantial increase in network tariffs and taxes
could be in line with other public interests that are also promoted by the EU
legislation. An increase in network tariffs could for example be considered reasonable
to achieve security of supply and environmental protection. Security of supply may
force Member States into massive investments to update transport and distribution
systems to cope with large volumes of renewable energy. Member States have
discretionary power to fulfil these tasks and in line with this to weigh and prioritize
different public interests.
Interpreting the concept of a reasonable price in terms of fairness and social justice
produces a different result, for in that case reasonable equates affordable. Although the Third
Electricity Directive does not explicitly state that the total energy bill must be reasonable in the
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sense of affordable, the requirement for Member States to ensure that this is the case may be
deduced from the general directive requirement to provide special protection for vulnerable
consumers. This requirement for Member States can also be deduced from the EU Charter. The
analysis of the various electricity bill components shows that for energy to become affordable,
additional provisions will be needed, in particular where vulnerable consumers are involved
(European Commission 2014a, pp. 242–245; European Commission 2013). These must
include measures that serve to limit the amount of the total energy bill, such as the introduction
of smart meters. In addition, Member States have discretionary authority to set their own
energy access criteria out of the multitude of EU regulatory provisions that address fuel
poverty. These may include provisional measures with regard to social security assistance
and support schemes as well as subsidies for improving the energy efficiency of public housing
(European Commission 2003, para. 3.1.4).
Various Member State bodies may be charged with monitoring the increase of the total end-
user electricity cost and introducing pre-emptive measures. The tasks of the NRAs are to
supervise a reasonable supply price and to regulate network tariffs. The purpose of tariff
regulation can also be the stimulation of an efficient use of networks. A firm foundation in
national energy law is therefore needed to give NRAs sufficient authority to weigh the various
public interests in relation to their regulatory policy. Further, other measures that may
contribute towards the affordability of electricity, such as domestic thermal insulation, form
part of government policy.
The above conclusions are consistent with the statement by the Council of Euro-
pean Energy Regulators in its B2020 vision for Europe’s energy customers,^24 in
which it articulated that the long-term trend for energy prices is to increase, and that
this trend makes it all the more important that the underlying reasons for such price
increases are made transparent and fair to all. In the opinion of the Council, however,
the problem is that regulators consider themselves primarily responsible for ensuring
the proper functioning of energy markets and for regulating the Bnatural monopoly^
element of the overall energy value chain, i.e., the transmission and distribution
network tariffs. These elements constitute only a portion of the final price paid by
customers, while other elements are subject to various government policies such as
taxation and renewable energy support.
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